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SHUTTING OFF THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE
I.	Introduction

Children from low-income and minority families disproportionately populate the
juvenile court, as well as juvenile shelter care, detention, and incarceration facilities.1
Less obvious, but equally intense, is the concentration in the juvenile system of children
with undiagnosed and unmet special education needs.2 For many special education
eligible children swept into the school-to-prison pipeline, a pivotal point is a status
offense charge for truancy, ungovernability, or running away.3 The “school-to-prison
1.

See, e.g., Joy G. Dryfoos, Adolescents at Risk: Prevalence and Prevention 39 tbl.3.7 (1991)
(describing low economic status as a “major predictor” of adolescent delinquency); Jerome G. Miller,
Last One Over the Wall: The Massachusetts Experiment in Closing Reform Schools 3–5
(1991); National Council on Crime and Delinquency, And Justice for Some: Differential
Treatment of Youth of Color in the Justice System 6–30 (2007), available at http://nccd-crc.
issuelab.org/research/listing/and_justice_for_some_differential_treatment_of_youth_of_color_in_
the_justice_system (presenting data showing disproportionate representation of minority youth at all
stages of the juvenile justice process); Michael J. Leiber, Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC)
of Youth: An Analysis of State and Federal Efforts to Address the Issue, 48 Crime & Delinq. 3, 14–19 (2002)
(assessing how states have addressed the federal DMC mandate); cf. Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report 9 (2006)
[hereinafter OJJDP, National Report], available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/nr2006/index.html
(reporting that nearly one-third of black juveniles live below the poverty line); Martha J. Coutinho &
Donald P. Oswald, Disproportionate Representation in Special Education: A Synthesis and Recommendations,
9 J. Child & Fam. Stud. 135, 135–56 (2000) (summarizing the current consensus on disproportionate
representation of minorities in special education).

2.

See David Osher et al., Schools Make a Difference: The Overrepresentation of African American Youth in
Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, in Racial Inequity in Special Education 93, 99–100
(Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002) (concluding that the educational system is allowing
children with or at risk for emotional disturbance to be funneled into the juvenile justice system rather
than supporting their emotional, behavioral, and educational needs); Robert B. Rutherford, Jr. et
al., Youth with Disabilities in the Correctional System: Prevalence Rates and
Identification Issues 7–19 (2002), available at http://cecp.air.org/juvenilejustice/docs/Youth%20
with%20Disabilities.pdf (reviewing and describing the prevalence of disabilities in detained youth); Sue
Burrell & Loren Warboys, Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, Juv. Just. Bull., July 2000,
at 1, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/179359.pdf [hereinafter Burrell & Warboys,
Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System] (“A significant proportion of youth in the juvenile justice
system have education-related disabilities and are eligible for special education and related services . . . .”);
Peter E. Leone et al., Understanding the Overrepresentation of Youths with Disabilities in Juvenile Detention,
3 UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 389 (1995) (collecting citations on the prevalence of disabilities among
incarcerated youth); Joseph B. Tulman, Disability and Delinquency: How Failures to Identify, Accommodate,
and Serve Youth with Education-Related Disabilities Leads to Their Disproportionate Representation in the
Delinquency System, 3 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 3, 4 n.2 (2003) [hereinafter Tulman,
Disability and Delinquency]; Clyde A. Winters, Learning Disabilities, Crime, Delinquency and Special
Education Placement, 32 Adolescence 451 (1997) (noting that between 28% and 43% of incarcerated
youth require special education services); see also National Council on Disability, Addressing the
Needs of Youth with Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice System: The Current Status of
Evidence-Based Research 11–12 (2003) [hereinafter NCD], available at http://www.ncd.gov/
newsroom/publications/pdf/juvenile.pdf (noting the high prevalence of learning disabilities and serious
emotional disturbance among incarcerated youth and generally weak research regarding prevalence of
children with disabilities in the delinquency system).

3.

Status offense charges are distinguished from delinquency charges. Delinquency charges are charges for
behavior that is criminal for both children and adults over the age of majority. See, e.g., David J.
Steinhart, Status Offenses, 6 The Future of Children 86, 86 (1996) (“A status offense is behavior that
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pipeline” represents the ways in which the failures of school systems to educate our
children contribute to the increase in the juvenile justice and adult prison population.4
State and federal law and policy favor keeping children with their families,5
mainstreaming special education students with non-disabled peers, 6 and
deinstitutionalizing status offenders.7 Although status offender diversion programs
are designed to be a catalyst for children’s integration into the community and a
bulwark against exclusion, children identified as status offenders often find themselves
in court proceedings and ultimately in restrictive placements, out of their schools,
and out of their homes. Thus, pushing children with undiagnosed and unmet special
is unlawful for children, even though the same behavior is legal for adults.”). Underage drinking is also
a status offense. Not surprisingly, children with disabilities are more likely to develop substance abuse
problems. See James R. Gress & Marion S. Boss, Substance Abuse Differences Among Students Receiving
Special Education School Services, 26 Child Psychiatry & Hum. Dev. 235, 244 (1996) (“[S]ignificant
differences in substance abuse among special education students were identified for each grade level.”);
Jeffrey S. Kress & Maurice J. Elias, Substance Abuse Prevention in Special Education Populations: Review
and Recommendations, 27 J. Spec. Educ. 35, 38–39 (1993) (reviewing literature on prevalence of
substance abuse in the special education population).
4.

In this way, the concept is both descriptive and normative. It is descriptive in that there are empirical
connections between schools and law enforcement. See Johanna Wald & Daniel J. Losen, Defining and
Redirecting a School-to-Prison Pipeline, in 99 New Directions for Youth Development:
Deconstructing the School-to-Prison Pipeline 9 (Johanna Wald & Daniel J. Losen eds., 2003)
(presenting empirical evidence of the pipeline and policies to address it). It is normative in that these
empirical connections represent both moral and legal failures. See Advancement Project et al,
Education on Lockdown: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track 15–19 (2005), available at http://
www.ncscatfordham.org/binarydata/files/FINALEOLrep.pdf (describing how zero tolerance policies fail
children and increase disproportionate minority representation). Part of the failure of schools to educate
children can be seen in the high dropout rate among minority students. See Gary Orfield et al., Losing
Our Future: How Minority Youth Are Being Left Behind by the Graduation Rate Crisis 2
(2004) (noting a 50.2% graduation rate among black students and a 68% graduation rate among all students
nationwide); cf. Children’s Defense Fund, America’s Cradle to Prison Pipeline 3 (2007) (“At
crucial points in [poor children’s] development, from birth through adulthood, more risks and disadvantages
cumulate and converge that make a successful transition to productive adulthood significantly less likely
and involvement in the criminal justice system significantly more likely.”).

5.

The Uniform Law Commissioners’ Model Juvenile Court Act of 1968, the blueprint for state laws on
child welfare, delinquency, and status offense matters, requires “achiev[ing] the . . . purposes [of the
Act] in a family environment whenever possible, separating the child from his parents only when
necessary for his welfare or in the interest of public safety.” Model Juvenile Ct. Act § 1(3) (Unif. Law
Comm’rs 1968) [hereinafter Model Act].

6.

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) contains a requirement for placing children
with disabilities in the “least restrictive environment.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006); see also infra Part
III.A.3.

7.

The legislative history of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (“JJDPA”) is
clear on this point. See S. Rep. No. 93–1011 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283 (“These
[juvenile] status offenders generally are inappropriate clients for the formal police courts and corrections
process of the juvenile justice system. These children and youth should be channeled to those agencies
and professions which are mandated [and in] fact purport to deal with the substantive human and social
issues involved in these areas.”). See generally Claire Shubik & Jessica Kendall, Rethinking Juvenile Status
Offense Laws: Considerations for Congressional Review of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act, 45 Fam. Ct. Rev. 384 (2007) (discussing the deinstitutionalization policy of the JJDPA and the
way in which Congress later created a loophole in the policy).
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education needs into the status offense system runs contrary to federal policy and is
ultimately counterproductive.
Special education law can be instrumental in shutting down the pipeline in two
ways. To begin, children who receive appropriate special education services can avoid
the sorts of behaviors—like unruliness in school and ungovernability at home—that
lead to status offense charges. Prevention and early intervention are, self-evidently,
superior approaches. Special education law provides for early intervention and
preventive services while maintaining youth in their own home and in the community.
Schools have a legal obligation to identify students with special education needs and
to provide them with individualized services to address those needs.8 Appropriate
implementation of federal special education mandates that identify and serve youth
with special education needs can go a long way toward preventing youth from being
caught up in the school-to-prison pipeline.
The second instrumental use of special education law can come about because
some youth do get caught up in the school-to-prison pipeline. A child facing status
offense charges is likely to be a child for whom school system personnel failed to
provide appropriate special education services, and with whom parents have become
increasingly frustrated. As such, an attorney should use that failure in conjunction
with a well-grounded understanding of federal special education law as a key
component of the defense strategy.
Additionally, the defense attorney should offer to help the child and the child’s
parents obtain appropriate special education services to address the child’s needs, to
stabilize the family, and to extricate the child from the status offense system. Effective
use of special education advocacy can insulate a child from the juvenile court,
re-establish the child in school, and help to stabilize a family in crisis.9
This article aims to provide a practical and theoretical guide to attorneys
representing status offenders who have education-related disabilities. Part II examines
how the failure to follow federal special education law creates some of the plumbing
in the school-to-prison pipeline. Part II examines how child advocates and their
clients can use special education law to extricate children from the status offense
system and begin to reverse and ultimately help shut down the pipeline.10 Toward
this end, Part III also provides advocates with a broad overview of federal special
8.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a)(1) (2009) (“child find” provision); 20
U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006) (defining free appropriate education).

9.

Another, more literal pay-off is that a prevailing parent in a special education matter is entitled to
attorneys’ fees at a reasonable (i.e., market) rate. Court-appointed attorneys who represent low-income
clients in status offense cases, therefore, might find that special education advocacy better serves their
clients’ interests, as well as their own. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)–(C) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.517(a)
(1)(i), (c) (2006) (describing circumstances in which parents of children with disabilities or state agencies
can receive reasonable attorneys’ fees in the court’s discretion).

10.

For a detailed description of how the failure of adults to follow special education law leads to the
disproportionate representation of children with disabilities in the delinquency system, see Tulman,
Disability and Delinquency, supra note 2; see also Dean H. Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform:
Litigating School Exclusion, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 265, 266–69 (2008) (describing the many ways in which
schools exclude students, including students with education-related disabilities). See generally supra note 2.
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education law and policy and its relationship with the state statutory requirements of
the juvenile court. Finally, Part IV describes the extensive services and behavioral
interventions that are available through special education law in contrast with the
interventions available through the juvenile court. Part IV will show that the only
intervention not available through special education law is incarceration and that
problems that potentially lead to status offense cases are most effectively addressed
with special education services rather than through the juvenile court.
II.	Status Offenders with Unmet Special Education Needs and the
School-to-Prison Pipeline

The idea behind the youth-specific jurisdiction over status offenses is that states
have a parens patriae interest in protecting youth who are on a slippery decline toward
delinquency.11 Status offenses are a special category of noncriminal misbehaviors,
including truancy, running away, curfew violations, underage drinking,
ungovernability, and other violations of rules that apply only to children.12
According to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (“JJDPA”),
since the 1970s, federal policy has been to “deinstitutionalize” status offenders.13
Status offenders were no longer to be incarcerated in juvenile institutions but diverted
into alternative community-based programs.14 The reason for this is clear: Congress
believed that status offenders were best rehabilitated in the community, that the
juvenile justice system could best spend its resources on more serious offenders, and
that juvenile court jurisdiction had a significant potential to exacerbate the underlying
circumstances of status offenders.15 While the incarceration of status offenders has
declined since this time, 4824 status offenders were incarcerated in public and private
juvenile facilities in 2003.16 Most of the incarcerated youth were found ungovernable
(1825), followed by runaways (997), and truants (841).17
11.

See Peter D. Garlock, “Wayward” Children and the Law, 1820–1900: The Genesis of the Status Offense
Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 341 (1979) (explaining the genesis of the juvenile court’s
status offense jurisdiction); George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent
or Tyrant?, 25 Depaul L. Rev. 895, 896–98 (1976) (providing an account of parens patriae jurisdiction
generally).

12.

Status offenders have different names in different jurisdictions. Common examples are CHINS, PINS,
and MINS (child/person/minor in need of supervision), Black’s Law Dictionary 1110 (8th ed.
2004).

13.

See supra note 7.

14.

The JJDPA requires that states that accept JJDPA funds progress toward removing status offenders
from juvenile institutions and develop non-secure alternative programs to address the needs of status
offenders. Pub. L. No. 93-415, § 223 (a)(12), 88 Stat. 1109 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (a)(11)(A))
(“[J]uveniles who are charged with or who have committed offenses that would not be criminal if
committed by an adult, shall not be placed in juvenile detention or correctional facilities . . . .”).

15.

See supra note 7.

16.

See OJJDP, National Report, supra note 1, at 198 (noting that a majority of status offenders were
detained in private facilities rather than public facilities).

17.

Id.
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These numbers, however, do not represent the full extent to which status
offenders are incarcerated. In 1980, Congress amended the JJDPA to allow juvenile
courts to incarcerate children “charged with or who have committed a violation of a
valid court order.”18 This expanded authority means many of the 14,135 children
incarcerated in secure facilities for “technical violations” may be status offenders.19 In
some states, technical violations comprise upward of one-third of the in-custody
juvenile population.20 Reports also indicate that status offenders are often relabeled
as “delinquent” to keep them housed in secure facilities.21 Some status offenders are
even committed to mental health facilities.22 Nonetheless, in most adjudicated status
offense cases countrywide, the juvenile court ordered probation; residential placement
was the second most-frequent dispositional outcome. 23 Those adjudicated
ungovernable were the most likely to be placed in a residential facility, while truants
were the most likely of status offenders to be placed on probation.24 Since a significant
and potentially large number of status offenders are still entering secure facilities,
much is at stake for a child facing a status offense charge.
18.

42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11)(A)(ii) (2006).

19.

See OJJDP, National Report, supra note 1, at 198.

20. Id. at 205. In Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming at

least 25% of offenders in custody were in custody for technical violations of probation, parole, or valid
court orders (“VCO”). Id. at 203. All of these states except New Jersey and Utah have valid court order
exceptions. See National Youth Rights Association, Survey of State Laws on the Valid
Court Order Exception to Secure Detention for Status Offenders 1 (2008), available at
http://www.youthrights.org/forums/downloads.php?do=file&id=374&act=down (summarizing the
VCO exception rules for each state). The likelihood of status offenders being part of the in-custody
technical violator population can also be gleaned from a brief glance at the data for states that do not
have a VCO exception. States without a VCO exception have high status offender populations, while
states that have low status offender populations have high technical violator populations. For example,
New York does not have a VCO exception, and 20% of its custody population is status offenders. OJJDP,
National Report, supra note 1, at 203.

21.

See Malcolm W. Klein, Deinstitutionalization and Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A Litany of Impediments,
1 Crime & Just. 145, 176–77 (1979) (“In California, the new 1977 law prohibiting secure detention of
status offenders led to a dramatic police response: up to 50 percent of status offenders formerly arrested
and dealt with by release, referral, or petition were now ignored by the police, while a small percentage
of others were relabeled as dependent or delinquent in order to obtain secure detention.”); W. Krause &
M.D. McShane, A Deinstitutionalization Retrospective: Relabeling the Status Offender, 17 J. Crime &
Just. 45 (1994) (finding that girls are more likely than boys to be relabeled, formally processed, and
incarcerated); David J. Steinhart, Status Offenses, 6 Future of Children 86, 91 (1996) (noting that
relabeling began after deinstitutionalization).

22.

See Lois A. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission
Rates, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 773, 798–808 (1988) (arguing that there is an increase in the use of hospitalization
to control troublesome youth even though they do not suffer from severe mental disorders).

23.

See OJJDP, National Report, supra note 1, at 191 (“From 1985 through 2002, among adjudicated
runaway, truancy, ungovernability, and liquor law violation cases, formal probation was the most likely
disposition.”).

24.

See id. at 192 (finding that 160 out of 625 status offenders adjudicated ungovernable were placed in a
facility).
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Following the JJDPA, some jurisdictions have implemented community-based
diversion programs to address status offenses. This development, however, should
not suggest that diversion is much less serious than the potential for secure detention:
“Instead of reducing the number of youth formally processed through the juvenile
justice system, these prevention and early intervention policies actually subject more
youths to formal justice system intervention.” 25 With this formal intervention in
mind, the Institute for Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association
(“IJA-ABA”) noted the “corrosive effects of treating non-criminal youth as those that
had committed crimes . . . .”26 Consequently, youth who are formally processed or
adjudicated under the status offense jurisdiction face, at best, probationary supervision
within the community and, at worst, incarceration.
A. Status Offenders with Unmet Special Education Needs

Status offenders are likely to be children with undiagnosed and unmet special
education needs. Any child between the ages of three and twenty-one, 27 inclusive, is
eligible for special education services if the child has a disability and the child requires
special education and related services due to the disability.28 Moreover, eligibility
25.

Ctr. on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, Widening the Net in Juvenile Justice and the
Dangers of Prevention and Early Intervention 1 (2001), available at www.cjcj.org/files/
widening.pdf. Worries about formally processing more status offenders are also connected with worries
about diverting precious public safety and welfare resources from youth in need of intervention to youth
who are not in need of intervention. See id.

26. Aidan R Gough, Am.Bar.Ass’n., Inst. of Judicial Admin., Juvenile Justice Standards Project,

Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior 7 (1982), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/ojjdp/83576.pdf. The IJA-ABA also noted: “On common sense grounds, given the lack of
conclusive empiric data, it seems likely that (1) coercive judicial intervention in unruly child cases
produces some degree of labeling and stigmatization; and (2) whatever effect this has on the child’s selfperception and future behavior will be adverse.” Id. The fact that status offense cases are treated similarly
to delinquency cases is also supported by the data. For example, in 2002, 23% of petitioned delinquency
cases resulted in residential placement, while 62% resulted in probation. OJJDP, National Report,
supra note 1, at 174. In comparison, between 1985 and 2002, 26% of petitioned ungovernability cases
resulted in residential placement, while 66% resulted in probation. Id. at 192. Consequently,
ungovernability dispositions are strikingly similar to delinquency dispositions. The numbers are similar
for runaway cases. See id. However, truancy cases and liquor law violation cases follow a different
pattern. See id.; cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29 (1967) (“If Gerald had been over 18, he would not have
been subject to Juvenile Court proceedings. For [using vulgar language in the presence of a woman], the
maximum punishment would have been a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not more than
two months. Instead, he was committed to custody for a maximum of six years.”).

27.

One should keep in mind that the way in which special education law defines “children” is different
from how juvenile justice statutes define “children” or “ juveniles.” However, there will be significant
overlap. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 601 (West 2008) (defining “minor” as an individual
under the age of eighteen). Thus, individuals through the age of twenty-one (i.e., until the twentysecond birthday) who are under the jurisdiction of the adult criminal court may have special education
rights. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.101(a), 300.102(a)(1)–(2) (2009).

28. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(a). For limitations on the age coverage of Part B, see

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.102. For example, a state also can constrict the ages of
eligibility. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(1) (allowing constriction for certain ages where inconsistent with
state policy or a court order). Nothing in the IDEA limits a state or local government from extending

881

SHUTTING OFF THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE

explicitly “include[s] children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled
from school.”29 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) covers any
disability that significantly affects a child’s learning and adjustment in school. 30
Children swept into the juvenile justice system are likely to be children with
unmet special education needs. Studies estimate that the prevalence of youth with
disabilities in juvenile corrections is between 30% and 70%, 31 while only 8.8% of
public school students have been identified as having disabilities that qualify them
for special education services.32 Children with disabilities and emotional disturbance
also have higher arrest rates than their non-disabled peers.33 Moreover, youth in the
eligibility to cover students past the twenty-second birthday. Michigan, for example, covers students with
disabilities (who have not graduated from high school) until the age of twenty-five. See Mich. Comp.
Laws §§ 380.1711, 380.1701, 380.1751 (2008). Special education attorneys should check state laws and
school district regulations to determine whether the state legislature or local education agency has extended
eligibility to cover students past the twenty-second birthday. Part B of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411–
1419, covers students between the ages of three and twenty-one. Part C of the act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1431–1445,
covers early intervention for children under three years of age and for their families.
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(a). Generally speaking, the IDEA covers students until

they graduate from high school or until they turn twenty-two, whichever occurs first, and obtaining a
high school equivalency degree, such as a G.E.D., does not terminate eligibility. See 34 C.F.R. §
300.102(a)(3)(i)–(iv) (describing specific exceptions, including retaining eligibility for coverage when a
student is suspended, expelled, or obtains a high school equivalency degree). It is also important to
know that a child who is advancing from grade to grade and is not failing can be, nonetheless, a “child
with a disability” covered under the IDEA. 34 C.F.R.§ 300.101(c).

30. A “child with a disability” is a child with “mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness),

speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance
. . . orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific
learning disabilities; and who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(3)(A)(i)–(ii). States may define a category of “developmental delay” for children between the
ages of three and nine. Id. § 1401(3)(B). For a child with a disability that does not affect academic
performance and adjustment in school—a child, for example, with a physical disability or with a chronic
illness—section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act likely protects the child from discrimination and affords
the child a right to reasonable accommodations in the school setting. See generally 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.31–
104.39 (listing the responsibilities of schools with respect to students with handicaps generally).

31.

See Robert B. Rutherford, Jr. et al., Youth with Disabilities in the Correctional System:
Prevalence Rates and Identification Issues 10–19 (2002) [hereinafter Rutherford, Prevalence
Rates]; P. Casey & I. Keilitz, Estimating the Prevalence of Learning Disabled and Mentally Retarded
Juvenile Offenders: A Meta-analysis, in Understanding Troubled and Troubling Youth 82 (Peter
E. Leone ed., 1990); Donna M. Murphy, The Prevalence of Handicapping Conditions Among Juvenile
Delinquents, 7 Remedial & Special Educ. 7 (1986); Robert B. Rutherford et al., Special Education in
the Most Restrictive Environment: Correctional/Special Education, 19 J. Special Educ. 59 (1985). The
most recent and comprehensive study estimates that 33.4% of youth in state juvenile correctional systems
have a disability. See Mary M. Quinn et al., Youth with Disabilities in Juvenile Corrections: A National
Survey, 71 Exceptional Child. 339, 342 (2005) [hereinafter Quinn, Youth with Disabilities]. However,
the disability prevalence rates for individual states ranged from 9.1% to 77.5%. See id.

32.

See U.S. Dep’t. of Educ., Twenty-third Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act II-21 (2001), available at http://www2.ed.
gov/about/reports/annual/osep/2001/section-ii.pdf.

33.

See Chesapeake Institute, National Agenda for Achieving Better Results for Children
and Youth With Serious Emotional Disturbance (1994), available at http://cecp.air.org/resources/
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juvenile justice system are more likely to have unidentified disabilities and unmet
special education needs.34
Although no data exists regarding the prevalence of disability in status offenders
as a distinct group, the connection is quite clear. Students with disabilities are more
likely to be unsuccessful in school and engage in undesirable behavior than their
non-disabled counterparts; therefore, they are more likely to be charged with
ungovernability.35 Students who struggle in school because of an education-related
disability are more likely to be truant, and students with poor school attendance are
more likely to not be identified as needing special education services when they in
fact need special education services.36
The disabilities that a defense attorney will likely find within a status offense
caseload include specific learning disabilities, speech or language impairments, and
emotional disturbance. Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) is also
common and is covered under the IDEA’s definition of “Other Health Impairment.”37
B. Youth with Education-Related Disabilities Flushed Down the Pipeline

Congress passed the initial, federal special education law, the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (“EAHCA”) in 1975. 38 Two groundbreaking cases,
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC), 39 and Mills v.
Board of Education,40 paved the way for this Congressional action.41 PARC resulted in
ntlagend.asp; Wagner et al., Youth with Disabilities: A Changing Population (2003), available
at http://www.nlts2.org/reports/2003_04-1/nlts2_report_2003_04-1_execsum.pdf.
34. See Quinn, Youth with Disabilities, supra note 31, at 342 (“Although the present investigation is a marked

improvement over earlier studies, in all likelihood the number of students with disabilities in juvenile
corrections . . . who are actually eligible for special education services is underestimated.”); Burrell &
Warboys, Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, supra note 2, at 1 (“[Y]outh in the juvenile justice
system are much more likely to have both identiﬁed and undiscovered disabilities.”) (emphasis added).

35.

Peter E. Leone et al., Nat’l. Ctr. on Educ., Disability & Juvenile Justice., School Failure,
Race, and Disability: Promoting Positive Outcomes, Decreasing Vulnerability for
Involvement with the Juvenile Delinquency System 3 (2003), available at http://www.edjj.org/
Publications/list/leone_et_al-2003.pdf [hereinafter Leone, Promoting Positive Outcomes]
(“Students with disabilities display higher rates of problem behavior and disciplinary referrals than their
schoolmates.”).

36. See Rutherford, Prevalence Rates, supra note 31, at 8 (“[M]any [youth in the juvenile justice

system] may not be identified and labeled by public schools for the simple reason that they seldom, or at
least sporadically, attend school and complete the special education procedures necessary to receive a
special education label.”).

37.

34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(9)(i)–(ii) (2009).

38. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§1400–1487 (2005)). The EAHCA

was the initial version of the IDEA. See William D. White, Where to Place the Burden: Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act Administrative Due Process Hearings, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1013, 1014 (2006).

39.

343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

40. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
41.

See White, supra note 38, at 1015.
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a consent order;42 Mills, a class action in the District of Columbia, resulted in a grant
of summary judgment for the “exceptional” children excluded from education.43
Judge Waddy’s description of the problem in Mills left no doubt that the overwhelming
majority of children with education-related disabilities received no educational
services from the school system.44 A pervasive part of the problem in Mills was the
practice of using the pretext of behavior as an excuse for excluding children with
disabilities from public education.45 Relying on Brown v. Board of Education for the
proposition that access to education is of central importance,46 Judge Waddy ruled
that the exclusion of children with disabilities violated equal protection.47 The court’s
final judgment mandated a number of provisions—substantive rights and procedural
protections—that later appeared in the EAHCA and the IDEA.48
In passing the federal special education law, Congress intended to address this
historical canard of failing to identify and serve children with education-related
disabilities and using the children’s behavior as a justification for their exclusion. As
the United States Supreme Court stated in Honig v. Doe,
Congress very much meant to strip schools of the unilateral authority they
had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students, particularly
emotionally disturbed students, from school. In so doing, Congress did not
leave school administrators powerless to deal with dangerous students; it did,
however, deny school officials their former right to “self-help,” and directed
that in the future the removal of disabled students could be accomplished
only with the permission of the parents or, as a last resort, the courts.49

The Court noted that one in eight disabled students had been excluded from the public
school system and many others were warehoused in special programs that were
ineffective in addressing their education needs.50 This practice is still all too common
as the data supports the conclusion that students with disabilities are disproportionately
suspended from schools.51 In particular, students with learning disabilities and
42.

Id. at 1016.

43.

Id.; Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 873.

44. See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 868–69.
45.

See, e.g., id. at 869 (describing the first two named plaintiffs and how they were excluded, without
procedural protections, as “behavior problem[s]”); see also id. at 878 (describing procedural protections
against suspensions and requirement for educational services during period of suspension).

46. White, supra note 38, at 1016 (citing Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874, quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.

483, 493 (1954)).

47.

Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874–75.

48. White, supra note 38, at 1016 (citing Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 877–83).
49. 484 U.S. 305, 323–24 (1988). As originally passed, the law created no exception to “stay put” for a child

who is allegedly dangerous. Id. at 323. School officials, however, could appeal to a court for a preliminary
injunction to seek removal of an allegedly dangerous child. See id.

50. See id. at 323–24.
51.

See Peter E. Leone et al., School Violence and Disruption: Rhetoric, Reality, and Reasonable Balance, 33 Focus
on Exceptional Child. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Leone, School Violence] (“Mounting evidence suggests that
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emotional disturbance are overrepresented within the class of students with disabilities
who are suspended.52 The behaviors for which these students are suspended, moreover,
are primarily non-violent and do not result in harm to others.53 Consequently, these
students would be more likely to fall under the status offense system, perhaps by
receiving a charge of ungovernability, rather than the delinquency system.
Against this backdrop, one can begin to interpret the increasing prevalence of
school administrators referring children to juvenile courts for alleged disruptive
conduct (whether that conduct is classified as a status offense or as a delinquency
matter).54 Schools referred 73% of the petitioned truancy cases in 2005, and
approximately 28% of all status offense cases.55 Truancy cases increased by 60%
between 1995 and 2005.56 So, attorneys defending youth against status offense
charges continue to encounter schools that fail to address the needs of children with
education-related disabilities and then attempt to pass these unserved children to the
juvenile court. Fortunately, federal special education law and state law provide
advocates with tools to address the growing number of children with undiagnosed
and unmet special education needs making contact with the juvenile court.
III.	Aggressive Special Education Advocacy in the Face of a Status
Offense Charge

Federal special education and status offender policy, in conjunction with state
statutory requirements, make possible effective procedural and substantive challenges
to status offense petitions.57 Federal and state law and policy create a presumption in
a disproportionately high percentage (possibly close to 20%) of suspended students are students with
disabilities, compared to a national proportion of about 11% of students ages 6–21 receiving services under
IDEA.”). Disproportionate representation is even more pronounced for black, male disabled students. See
Leone, Promoting Positive Outcomes, supra note 35, at 2 (“[B]lack, male students with disabilities
were punished more severely than others for commission of the same offense.”).
52.

See Leone, School Violence, supra note 51, at 13 (“Several studies demonstrate that students with learning
disabilities and emotional disturbance are overrepresented among suspended students with
disabilities.”).

53.

See id. (“Several studies have found that the majority of suspension-related behaviors seem to be
nonviolent and generally do not result in injuries to others.”).

54. See David Richart et al., Building Blocks for Youth, Unintended Consequences: The Impact

of “Zero Tolerance” and Other Exclusionary Policies on Kentucky Students 26 (2003),
available at http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/kentucky/kentucky.pdf; Civil Rights Project,
Opportunities Suspended: The Devastating Consequences of Zero Tolerance and School
Discipline Policies 15 (2000), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/discipline/
final_report.pdf.

55.

See Charles Puzzanchera & Melissa Sickmund, Nat’l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile
Court Statistics 2005 82 (2005), available at www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/njcda/pdf/jcs2005.pdf.

56. Id. at 72. “Between 1995 and 2005, the petitioned truancy case rate increased steadily (45%).” Id. at 73.
57.

This holds true for attorneys representing children charged with delinquency as well. See generally
Marsha L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Changing the Narrative: Convincing Courts to Distinguish
Between Misbehavior and Criminal Conduct in School Referral Cases, 9 UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 53 (2007);
Tulman, Disability and Delinquency, supra note 2.
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favor of addressing the needs of a significant proportion of status offenders through
the special education system rather than the juvenile justice system.58 What follows is
a roadmap for attorneys concerned with preventing children with unmet special
education needs from being sent down the school-to-prison pipeline via the status
offense system. But first, a brief overview of the responsibilities that school officials
have under federal special education law is in order.
A. IDEA Obligations
		

1. Free and Appropriate Education

The substantive entitlement in the IDEA is the right to a free appropriate public
education (“FAPE”).59 FAPE means “special education and related services” that
meet state standards, in an appropriate school setting, and in accordance with the
child’s individualized education program (“IEP”).60 The word “free” means that the
parent does not pay for the child’s services.61 The word “appropriate” is more difficult
to define and is the focus of a key Supreme Court case, Board of Education v. Rowley.62
According to the Court, the instruction must be individualized to meet the child’s
unique needs63 with supportive services necessary to ensure that the child benefits,64
but “appropriateness” does not require maximizing the child’s educational
58. Advocates who worry about disproportionate identification of minority students as special education

students might worry that this article advocates inappropriately casting a child client as in need of
special services when in fact the child client is not disabled. The article is not advocating this. Instead,
the article advocates a strategy that addresses unidentified and unmet special education needs that are
manifest in a status offense charge. Thus, the objective is quite the opposite since it is often a lack of
special education advocacy and defense that results in poor minority youth moving into the juvenile
system while their white counterparts, particularly those from upper-income families, do not reach the
delinquency court or are diverted based on special education considerations.

59.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (defining “free appropriate public education”).

60. Id. § 1401(9)(B)–(D).
61.

Section 1401(9)(A) provides that the services must be “provided at public expense, under public
supervision and without charge.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A). This right to appropriate services at no charge
to the parent leads to an important remedy: if the public school placement or services are not appropriate,
the parent may be entitled to a private school placement or services at government expense. See 34
C.F.R. § 300.148 (2009).

62. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). In Rowley, the Court also underscored the law’s procedural requirement that

school administrators include the parents in all special education decision making. Id. at 205–06
(“Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and
guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process . . . as it did upon
the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard.”).

63. Id. at 207. Toward this end, a child with a special education need will be given an IEP, which is a written

blueprint of the specialized instruction and other services—e.g., related services, transition services,
assistive technology, program modifications—that are appropriate for the child. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14),
1414(d). For a more detailed explication of IEPs and services available see infra Part IV.A.

64. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201 (“We therefore conclude that the ‘basic floor of opportunity’ provided by the

[IDEA] consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed
to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.”) (emphasis added).
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opportunities.65 In assessing educational benefit, the inquiry should include not only
academic progress, but also the child’s adjustment and preparation for life after high
school.66
		

2. Child Find and Evaluation

The “child find” provision of special education law mandates that school district
administrators and personnel identify, locate, and evaluate all children with
disabilities, including homeless children and children who are wards of the state.67
To determine whether the student has an education-related disability, the law
provides for an evaluation process68 that addresses “all areas of suspected disability.”69
A parent can initiate an evaluation by requesting it, or a state or local education
agency, or other state agency, may initiate a request for an initial evaluation.70 A state
court meets the criterion of “other state agency,” and, accordingly, a juvenile court

65.

See id. at 198–201 (“[T]o require . . . the furnishing of every special service necessary to maximize each
handicapped child’s potential is . . . further than Congress intended to go.”). The fact that a mainstreamed
child is achieving adequate grades and advancing from grade to grade is a significant, but not necessarily
dispositive, factor in determining “educational benefit.” Id. at 202–03. For a child in a regular classroom,
the IEP and individualized instruction should be “reasonably calculated” to facilitate the child achieving
passing grades and advancing from grade to grade. Id. at 203–04.

66. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
67.

Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a)(1) (2009).

68. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)–(c) (mandating a “full and individual” evaluation); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.300–311

(detailing all aspects of the evaluation process).

69. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(4). The evaluation must also be, among other criteria,

comprehensive, 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(6), nondiscriminatory, id. § 300.304(c)(1)(i), properly
administered, id. § 300.304(c)(1)(iii)–(v), and in the child’s native language or other mode of
communication, id. § 300.304(c)(1)(ii). Under the 2004 amendments, a state must permit, and a school
district may use, a “response-to-intervention” (“RTI”) approach for determining whether a student is
learning disabled. See id. §§ 300.307(a)(2), 300.309(a)(2)(i), 300.311(a)(7). Through RTI, school
personnel use interventions with research-based demonstrated effectiveness to address a student’s
academic deficits. This approach allows early intervention and can help avoid unnecessarily applying the
“special education” label. A parent is entitled to have the child evaluated for special education eligibility
and is not required to wait for pre-referral services like RTI. See, e.g., id. § 300.311(a)(7)(ii)(C) (requiring
that parents be notified that they may request an evaluation).

70. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(B). Attorneys and juvenile court officials should appropriately point out this

option to a parent who files an ungovernability petition against his or her own child. In many cases,
parents file juvenile court petitions because they have already been rebuffed by schools that resist
providing behavior and mental health services to children who are entitled to them. See U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office, Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice: Federal Agencies Could Play a
Stronger Role in Helping States Reduce the Number of Children Placed Solely to Obtain
Mental Health Services 30 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03397.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice] (“Some parents
bypass eligibility restrictions for special education services and procedures for receiving child welfare,
mental health, and juvenile justice services by petitioning the court to provide mental health and specific
education services for their child.”).
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judge may request an evaluation.71 Following an initial evaluation and a determination
of eligibility,72 the school system must reevaluate the child—referred to as a “triennial
evaluation”—at least once every three years.73 A reevaluation must occur sooner if
school district personnel determine that the child’s educational or related service
needs require reevaluation, or if the parent or teacher requests reevaluation.74 Upon
identifying a child with special education needs, the school must then provide
appropriate supportive services in the “least restrictive environment.” 75
		

3. Least Restrictive Environment

Special education law emphasizes keeping children in, or returning children to,
the educational mainstream.76 The IDEA’s emphasis on placement in the least
restrictive environment recognizes that education is meant to integrate students and,
ultimately, to prepare students to graduate from high school and enter mainstream
society through post-secondary education or the work world.77 Ideally, therefore,
schools should place students in integrated schools and in mainstream, regular
education classes, and may only remove children from regular education settings
“when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.”78

71.

An evaluation requires both written notice to the parent of the evaluations to be conducted, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1414(b)(1), and informed consent from the parent, id. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I). Generally, the initial
evaluation must be completed within sixty days of parental consent. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(C)(i)(I)–(II).

72. A parent has a right to obtain an independent educational evaluation (“IEE”) of the child, 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(b)(1) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.502, and the parent has a right to an IEE at public expense if the
parent disagrees with an evaluation conducted by the school system, id. § 300.502(b). Remarkably, if a
parent who disagrees with the school system’s evaluation requests an IEE at public expense, school
system administrators, “without unnecessary delay,” either must grant the request or request a hearing to
attempt to show that its evaluation is appropriate. Id. § 300.502(b)(2).

73. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.303(b)(2).
74.

20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.303(a)(1)–(2). School administrators must also
provide prior written notice, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1), and obtain informed consent from the parent, id. at
§ 1414(c)(3), before conducting a reevaluation.

75. Id. § 1412(a)(5).
76. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in

public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled . . . .”).

77.

See id. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (requiring that special education students be prepared for “further education,
employment, and independent living”).

78. Id. § 1412(a)(5)(A). Placement should be as close as possible to the child’s home and, ordinarily, should

be in the school that the child would attend if not disabled. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)–(c). The school
district must also have available a “continuum of alternative placements” that includes special classes,
special schools, home instruction, and the like. Id. § 300.115.
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4. Discipline Protections

Any child, without regard to disability, who is facing even a short-term exclusion
from school, has a right to due process.79 When removal of a child with an educationrelated disability for ostensibly disciplinary reasons is for a longer period, and thus
constitutes a “change in placement,” the procedural safeguards of the IDEA are
activated.80 Removal of a child with special education needs from school for more
than ten days constitutes a “change in placement” under special education law.81 Such
a “change in placement” triggers procedural protections82 to ensure that the authorities
are not removing a child with a disability in a manner that is discriminatory83 or for
behavior that is a manifestation of the disability.84 If the behavior is not a manifestation
of a disability, school authorities may discipline a child with a disability as they would
a non-disabled child,85 except that the child nevertheless maintains the right to
participate in the general education curriculum and progress toward meeting the
goals their IEP, although perhaps in a different setting.86 A child with a disability
does not lose the entitlement to special education and related services, even if excluded
from school.
A child with a disability sent to an interim alternative education setting or a
child with a disability suspended or expelled for conduct that was not a manifestation
of the disability has a right, as appropriate, to a functional behavioral assessment and
a behavior intervention plan, as well as a right to modifications in the IEP to address
the behavior that led to the disciplinary exclusion from the current educational
placement.87
79. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (”Students facing temporary suspension have interests

qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause . . . .”). Due process requires some kind of notice
and hearing, as well as an explanation of the evidence and an opportunity to be heard. Id.

80. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.504(a), 300.530(h).
81.

34 C.F.R. § 300.536(a)(1) (removal for more than ten consecutive days); id. § 300.536(a)(2) (removal for
more than ten days that are not consecutive but that constitute a pattern creating a change in placement).
Even a short suspension from school of ten days or less requires some due process protection. Goss, 419
U.S. at 581.

82. E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(H); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(h) (2009).
83. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(b)(1).
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)–(F); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(e)–(f); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(K)(1)(E)(i)(I)–(II);

34 C.F.R. § 300.530(e)(1)(i)–(ii) (noting that conduct is a manifestation if the disability caused, or
substantially and directly related to, the conduct; or the conduct is a manifestation if it directly resulted
from failure to implement child’s IEP).

85. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(c).
86. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(d)(1)(i). If the behavior is a manifestation of the

child’s disability but the behavior was having a weapon or illegal drugs in school or if the behavior
caused serious bodily injury to another person in school, school authorities may remove the child to an
interim alternative educational setting for no more than forty-five days. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(G); 34
C.F.R. § 300.530(g).

87.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(d)(1)(ii).
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Of course, the school can decide to include appropriate behavioral interventions
in the IEP at any time to prevent or to address a child’s behavioral problems. For a
child with serious behavioral concerns, those that are manifesting in status offenses
or delinquent offenses, schools are obligated, under federal law, to develop and adopt
a protocol of individualized, positive behavioral interventions and supports.88
For a child who has not previously been identified as eligible for special education
and who is facing suspension or expulsion, a parent can successfully assert rights to
procedural protection under the IDEA if school personnel “had knowledge . . . that the
child was a child with a disability before the behavior that precipitated the disciplinary
action occurred.”89 The school personnel are deemed to have had knowledge if the
parent previously raised concerns about the child’s need for special education, if the
parent previously requested an evaluation, or if the child’s teacher or other school
personnel expressed concerns about the child’s pattern of behavior to supervisors.90
Regarding a child not previously identified and about whom school personnel did not
have knowledge that the child has a disability, a parent who requests a special education
evaluation has a right to an expedited evaluation if the child is being subjected to
disciplinary sanctions.91 If the team determines, based on the expedited evaluation and
other input, that the child has an education-related disability, then the child is protected
under the IDEA (including its discipline protections), and school system personnel
must provide special education and related services.92
B. Status Offenders and Schools Avoiding IDEA Obligations

In a small number of reported status offense and delinquency cases, attorneys
have argued, successfully and unsuccessfully, that school personnel sought juvenile
court intervention to circumvent or make an “end run” around their obligations under
federal special education law.93 Successful cases resemble Honig, except that they
involve law enforcement and the juvenile court rather than exclusion only. Because
the IDEA requires exhausting administrative remedies before appealing to a state or
88. If parents or attorneys are working with a school to address a child’s behavior problems, the protocol

should contain an explicit agreement to avoid, except in extreme circumstances, calling the police and
referring the child to the juvenile court.

89. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5); 34 C.F.R. § 300.534.
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(B)(i)–(iii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(b)(1)–(3).
91.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(D)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(d)(2)(i).

92.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(D)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(d)(2)(iii). For challenges to special education
decisions that involve a disciplinary change in placement, including a challenge to a manifestation
determination, the law provides for an expedited hearing. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(k)(3), (4)(B); 34 C.F.R.
§§ 300.532(a), (c)(2). School officials can seek an expedited hearing to seek to exclude from the current
educational placement a child with a disability whom they allege to be a danger to self or others. 34
C.F.R. § 300.532(c)(2).

93.

See, e.g., In re Trent N., 569 N.W.2d 719, 738 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (“[I]f the school is truly engaging in
an ‘end run,’ that concern can be addressed at the various investigative and referral levels within the
juvenile court system which determine whether the case belongs in the juvenile system in the first
instance, and, if so, how it should be processed.”).
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federal court,94 the juvenile court is not the correct forum in which to litigate IDEA
eligibility and denial of a FAPE, nor is it the right forum to challenge the propriety
of suspending and expelling students with disabilities. However, an attorney should
use a special education hearing to challenge a school administrator who fails to
comply with the IDEA and then files a status offense petition against a child. Morgan
v. Chris L. is such a case.95
While schools can refer students to law enforcement, schools should not refer
students to law enforcement for status offenses as a substitute for providing parents
and students with the procedural and substantive protections of the IDEA.96 In
Morgan v. Chris L., the Sixth Circuit upheld an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”)
decision that a school district violated the IDEA when it filed a juvenile court
petition against a student with ADHD because he broke a school bathroom pipe.97
The Sixth Circuit found that the school had violated the procedural requirements of
the IDEA by filing a petition in the juvenile court before evaluating the student in a
timely fashion, before initiating a special education team meeting to address the
behavior, and before initiating what the court believed to be a “change in placement.” 98
Consequently, the court upheld the ALJ’s ruling directing the school to dismiss the
juvenile court petition that it had filed.99
Subsequent to the Chris L. case, Congress, in the 1997 IDEA amendments,
clarified that federal special education law does not constrain agencies (including
schools) from referring alleged criminal activity by a child with a disability to proper
authorities, nor does the law keep police and courts from handling such matters:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prohibit an agency from
reporting a crime committed by a child with a disability to appropriate
authorities or to prevent State law enforcement and judicial authorities from
exercising their responsibilities with regard to the application of Federal and
State law to crimes committed by a child with a disability.100
94. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2), (l); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(a), (e).
95. 927 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1994), aff ’d, 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997). A distinguishing feature of

Morgan v. Chris L. is that Tennessee’s statutes authorize school-initiated petitions in the juvenile court,
whereas in most states, school officials must rely upon juvenile court personnel to file a petition. See
Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 725; accord Commonwealth v. Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d 883, 886–87 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2002). Tennessee now prohibits school officials from filing a petition against a special
education student unless they first find that the alleged behavior was not a manifestation of the child’s
disability. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-10-1304(b)(3)(B) (2008).

96. See infra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
97.

No. 94-6561, 1997 WL 22714, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1997). Not all cases of this sort, in particular
Chris L., involve status offense. But the form of the violation of the IDEA is the same, as well as the
form of argument that defense attorneys should use.

98. See id. at *4–6.
99. Id. at *1.
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(A) (this provision was originally codified, following the 1997 amendments, at

1415(k)(9)(A)). One might presume that Congress meant for subsection 1415(k)(6)(A) to cover
“delinquent acts” and “status offenses,” as well as “crimes.” The language is significant considering
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Courts and commentators have misunderstood the relationship between the 1997
amendments and Chris L.-like cases, believing that the amendments “implicitly
rejected” the reasoning of Chris L.101 and that Chris L. was “effectively overruled.”102
This view reflects a misunderstanding of the procedural history of Chris L. Nothing
in the federal special education law before or after 1997 suggests that Congress
intended to restrict or otherwise interfere with the work of police officers,103 probation
officers, prosecutors, and judges.104 In passing the 1997 amendments, Congress was
not changing the substance of the law, nor was it overruling the reasoning behind
Chris L. Rather, Congress was reaffirming the central holding of Honig—that
schools cannot unilaterally exclude troublesome students as a substitute for meeting
their substantive and procedural obligations under federal special education law.
Chris L. was a special kind of case. At the time, Tennessee school officials were
able to directly file a “petition” against a child in juvenile court.105 This power is
distinct from the mere power to report a crime, and instead is akin to pressing
charges against a child and initiating juvenile court jurisdiction over the matter.
Thus, in Chris L. there are two important and related points. First, Chris L. focused
on whether an ALJ can order school officials to seek dismissal of a juvenile court
petition initiated by the very same school officials. Consequently, Chris L. did not
federal status offender policy generally. Whether to argue that the omission of these terms is significant,
on the other hand, is left, for present purposes, to the judgment of the individual attorney.
101. Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d at 887.
102. Joseph M. ex rel. Kimberly F. v. Se. Delco Sch. Dist., No. CIV. A. 99-4645, 2001 WL 283154, at *6

(E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2001).

103. The role of police officers—particularly those assigned to public schools and “school resource officers”—

presents issues that are beyond the scope of this article. Minimally, attorneys should consider the possibility
of negotiating agreements within IEP meetings that would preclude school administrators from
summoning or countenancing police intervention concerning behaviors that are manifestations of the
child’s disability, and that should be addressed with behavioral plans and IDEA related services. Obviously,
such agreements should explicitly exclude serious and violent delinquent or criminal behavior.

104. As noted above, the Supreme Court ruled in Honig that Congress meant to end the practice of schools

unilaterally excluding children with disabilities, and particularly children with emotional and behavioral
issues, under pretextual and unfair applications of school discipline procedures. Honig, 484 U.S. at
323–24. Congress has not retreated fundamentally from its intention to prohibit school administrators
from unilaterally excluding children with disabilities. Accord Gun-Free Schools Act, 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)
(1) (2006) (requiring states that receive federal education money to have a state law requiring local
education agencies (“LEAs”) to expel any student bringing a firearm to school or possessing a firearm
in school; the state law, however, can allow the chief of a LEA to modify expulsion on a case-by-case
basis). Subsection (c), furthermore, is a “special rule” providing that “[t]he provisions of this section shall
be construed in a manner consistent with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act . . . .” Id. §
7151(c). In this regard, the more significant amendment to the IDEA in 1997 was the addition of a
“dangerousness” exception that allows school administrators, in three specific circumstances, to place a
student with a disability in an interim alternative educational setting for up to forty-five days. Id. §
1415(k)(1)(G); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(g). If the behavior, though, is not a manifestation of the disability,
then school administrators can discipline the student as they would discipline a student who is not
disabled, except that the special education student continues to have a right to receive a FAPE. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(b)(1).

105. See Chris L., 927 F. Supp. at 269.
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address whether schools could report crimes to law enforcement. Thus, Chris L. is
consistent with the final outcome of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA. While the
amendments permit reporting a crime, the Department of Education explained that
this is distinct from what took place in Chris L.: “[t]he Act does not address whether
school officials may press charges against a [child with disabilities] when they have
reported a crime by that student.”106 Accordingly, the Chris L. court was merely
reiterating the prohibition articulated in Honig against the practice of schools
unilaterally excluding children with disabilities for reasons related to the school’s
failure, under federal special education law. School administrators cannot “end run”
their special education responsibilities.
Even if a school refers a student to the juvenile court, they are still required to
satisfy their procedural and substantive obligations under the IDEA.107 In specific
instances, an ALJ should order school officials to seek dismissal and work within the
framework of the IDEA. To serve a child charged with a status offense adequately,
therefore, the attorney—in addition to defending the child in juvenile court—should
assert rights affirmatively in a special education administrative due process hearing
and, if necessary, in a subsequent civil litigation.108 One might think of this strategy
as turning a defendant into a plaintiff.109
The second point addressed by Chris L. is that a school that has the ability to
directly file a petition in juvenile court essentially has the power to bypass the
gatekeeping function of an intake officer and a juvenile prosecutor. In this way, the
power to file a juvenile court petition is the power to manipulate the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court. This distinguishes Chris L. from other cases involving whether
the juvenile court could exercise jurisdiction before the IDEA due process review is
completed. For example, in Trent N., a state appellate court pointed out that the
IDEA does not generally circumscribe the jurisdiction of the juvenile court but
instead is directed at school action.110 Thus, the IDEA due process requirements
operate “parallel” to juvenile court jurisdiction.111
106. Larry D. Bartlett, Special Education Students and the Police: Many Questions Unanswered, 185 Educ. L.

Rep. 1, 4 (2004)(citing and quoting from Attachment 1—Analysis of Comments and Changes, 64 Fed.
Reg. 12537, 12631 (Mar. 12, 1999)).

107. See, e.g., Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 724 (“The school’s responsibility under the IDEA, to provide disabled

children with an appropriate education, does not end when a child enters the juvenile system. Both case
law and statutes support the proposition that the IDEA continues to work even when a child is involved
in juvenile court proceedings.”).

108. The juvenile defense attorney can learn special education law and practice, or, alternatively, the defense

attorney can help the child’s parent locate a capable special education attorney who is willing to provide
the representation. Assuming that the family is indigent or has little income, the special education
attorney should be prepared to provide representation based upon a retainer agreement through which—
consistent with legal ethics—the attorney and client identify the attorney’s hourly rate, but, nevertheless,
rely upon the fee-shifting provision of the IDEA.

109. See generally Joseph B. Tulman, The Best Defense is a Good Offense: Incorporating Special Education Law into

Delinquency Representation in the Juvenile Law Clinic, 42 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 223 (1992).

110. See Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 724.
111. Bartlett, supra note 106, at 2.
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However, the Trent N. court rightly observed that cases in which schools can
directly petition the juvenile court are distinct.112 In Trent N., only the district attorney
could invoke jurisdiction by initiating proceedings.113 This jurisdiction, furthermore, is
only exercised after the juvenile court, and the district attorney in particular, have
complied with their statutory investigative and referral requirements.114 Consequently,
a school administrator who, in regard to a particular student, fails to comply with the
IDEA and then files a status offense petition against that child is arguably warping the
jurisdictional balance struck between the juvenile court and the IDEA administrative
review. In this way they are abusing their petitioning authority.
Although attorneys likely will not encounter binding case law authority on this
question, one fair interpretation of section 1415(k)(6)(A) of the IDEA is that a special
education hearing officer cannot prohibit a school administrator from referring a
child to the juvenile court. On the other hand, a hearing officer in a special education
matter is absolutely empowered to rule upon whether school personnel failed to serve
the child appropriately and failed to follow the IDEA’s procedural requirements, as
well as on whether the alleged behavior is a manifestation of the child’s disability.
The juvenile court, of course, can obtain and maintain jurisdiction over a child in
a status offense matter notwithstanding the fact that school officials are satisfying
their obligations under the IDEA but nonetheless refer a special education student to
the juvenile court. Such a case, however, should be rare. In passing the IDEA,
Congress did not intend to supplant the states’ “general welfare and supportive
services for children.”115 Recognizing that Congress sought to protect children with
disabilities from school removal, the New York Court of Appeals in In re Beau II
found no evidence that school authorities sought to change a child’s placement by
filing a status offense petition; rather, the court found that the school sought to
reinforce the child’s participation in the school’s IEP.116 The student was not attending
school, and, therefore, school officials were having difficulty successfully
implementing his IEP. The court found that, in regard to the child’s special education
needs, the status offense action was “compatible and supportive.”117 It is important,
consequently, to recognize that in some cases the juvenile court has an interest in the
welfare of children that is coextensive with the interest that Congress and wellmeaning school officials have in the welfare of a child.
112. See Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 725 (“Wisconsin schools do not have statutory authority to initiate juvenile

petitions.”).

113. See id.
114. See id. at 725 n.9 (“A juvenile referral may be subject to various levels of review before and after a

petition is filed.”).

115. In re Beau II, 95 N.Y.2d 234, 240 (2000) (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176) (habitual school tardiness).
116. See id. at 239–40.
117. Id. at 240. It has also been found that a status offense case was not an improper effort to change the

educational placement of a suicidal child where there was an IEP meeting to evaluate placement needs.
In re Charles U., 837 N.Y.S.2d 356 (3d Dep’t 2007).
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Along these lines we can begin to understand the proper relationship between
schools and the juvenile court with respect to status offenders. While schools can refer
students to the juvenile court, schools cannot initiate juvenile court jurisdiction as a
substitute for their own IDEA obligations. Schools, despite referring students with
disabilities to law enforcement, are still obligated to satisfy the procedural and
substantive requirements of the IDEA. Finally, schools should be encouraged, and
perhaps are obligated, to seek juvenile court intervention when juvenile court
intervention is necessary for successful implementation of the school’s obligations under
the IDEA, for example, in cases where children are not attending school and the school
has identified and attempted to implement robust interventions to address the student’s
education needs, including addressing why the student is not attending school.118
The defense attorney typically is appointed to represent the child after the filing
of a status offense petition (or even after the child’s failure in a status offense diversion
program). In order to negotiate a dismissal of the petition or to effectively challenge
the intake process, the attorney must rapidly uncover the facts and legal claims that
are germane to both the status offense matter and the parallel special education case.
The special education advocacy process, however, often will require several months,
particularly if the child was not previously evaluated and identified as eligible for
special education. For this reason, the defense attorney is not usually in a position
early in the defense of a status offense case to present to the juvenile court a hearing
officer’s determination establishing a denial of a FAPE.
Given time constraints, a more manageable strategy is to negotiate a continuance
of the status offense matter to help the parent use special education processes—e.g.,
an IEP meeting or a due process hearing—to line up appropriate services for the
child and for the family that will supersede the perceived need for the status offense
proceeding.119 A defense attorney would be well-advised, therefore, to present a
hearing officer’s findings and rulings in the child’s favor on these particular issues to
probation officers, prosecutors, and judges in the juvenile system for the purpose of
having the charges dropped, the argument being that the child should not be
118. Cf. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 735(d)(iii) (McKinney 2009).

Id.

[W]here the entity seeking to file a petition is a school district or local educational
agency, the designated lead agency shall review the steps taken by the school district or
local educational agency to improve the youth’s attendance and/or conduct in school
and attempt to engage the school district or local educational agency in further diversion
attempts, if it appears from review that such attempts will be beneficial to the youth.

119. See ACLU of Washington & TeamChild, Defending Youth in Truancy Proceedings: A

Practice Manual for Attorneys 75 (2008), available at http://www.teamchild.org/pdf/Truancy%20
Manual%202008.pdf [hereinafter Defending Youth] (recommending that defense counsel file motion
for stay or seek a joint request for continuance of status offense matter in order to address reasons for
truancy); cf. In re Ruffel P., 582 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (permitting two continuances
on a hearing on defense counsel’s motion to dismiss in order to await special education decision making
by the IEP team). But cf. In re C.S., 804 A.2d 307, 309 (D.C. 2002) (noting that trial court that first
ordered and awaited submission of IEP did not abuse its discretion by conducting disposition hearing
without receiving or considering the IEP).
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responsible for the failings of school officials and that the child’s best interest is
served by seeking the IDEA services.
C. Discriminatory Actions Prohibited by the A.D.A. and the Rehabilitation Act

If evidence shows that school officials are referring children with disabilities to
the juvenile court on the basis of behavior for which officials are not referring nondisabled children, the defense attorney should consider advancing an argument,
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)120 or section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act,121 that the status offense prosecution is discriminatory:
Of course, it would be a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 if a school were discriminating against children with disabilities in how
they were acting under this authority (e.g., if they were only reporting crimes
committed by children with disabilities and not [those] committed by
nondisabled students).122

Schools would effectively be tainting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with
schools’ own discriminatory actions. Juvenile court officials should be worried about
this given that a state court or local law enforcement can be considered to be a
“program or activity receiving federal financial assistance” for purposes of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.123 Consequently, if the juvenile court does a proper
investigation of the status offense complaint and finds evidence of discriminatory
practices, it should be wary about continuing with a status offense petition for fear of
itself engaging in a discriminatory practice. If the court does not do a sufficient
investigation, it is failing to satisfy its own state law investigatory obligations.
If the court investigates and there is evidence that school officials are not
satisfying their IDEA obligations toward a child before the court, in some states, the
court may order school officials to comply with their obligations under the IDEA.124
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”).

121. Rehabilitation Act of 1976, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability

in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . . .”).

122. 64 Fed. Reg. 12406, 12631 (Mar. 12, 1999).
123. See, e.g., Doe v. Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 1126, 1136–37 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding that a police department

fell under section 504 in an action alleging discrimination based on HIV status); Greater Los Angeles
Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 607 F. Supp. 175, 179–81 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that a judicial
system could be considered a recipient of federal financial assistance under section 504).

124. The way in which the juvenile court exercises jurisdiction over school officials seems to vary by

jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, the court may, following notice and an opportunity to be heard, join
school officials as party to the juvenile court proceedings. E.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 727(a)
(2008) (“To facilitate coordination and cooperation among governmental agencies, the court may, after
giving notice and an opportunity to be heard, join in the juvenile court proceedings any agency that the
court determines has failed to meet a legal obligation to provide services to the minor.”). In some
jurisdictions, it seems, the court can exercise jurisdiction merely by ordering school officials to do
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This may include an order to evaluate a child,125 or an order to provide appropriate
services.126 Unfortunately, in some jurisdictions, the juvenile court may only exercise
jurisdiction over school officials after the child is adjudicated a status offender.127 In
these jurisdictions, attorneys should negotiate a continuance of the status offense
proceeding to help the parent use special education processes to put in place appropriate
services for the child that will supersede the need for a status offense adjudication.
D. State Statutory Obligations of Intake Officers

A primary purpose of the juvenile court is to divert children away from being
processed through the criminal justice system.128 One unique feature of the juvenile
court is often unrecognized: the duty and ability of intake probation officers to divert
youth away from being processed by the juvenile justice system.129
State statutes generally reflect the historical importance of the intake process in
at least one of two ways. First, intake officers are generally charged with a duty to
something. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.18(1) (West 2006) (“After . . . a petition for delinquency has
been filed, the court may order the child . . . to be evaluated by a psychiatrist or a psychologist, by a
district school board educational needs assessment team, or, if a developmental disability is suspected or
alleged, by a developmental disabilities diagnostic and evaluation team . . . .”).
125. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(B) (“[A] State educational agency, other State agency, or local educational

agency may initiate a request for an initial evaluation to determine if the child is a child with a
disability.”). The power to order evaluation does not vary by jurisdiction.

126. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 727 (2008) (“The court has no authority to order services unless it has

been determined through the administrative process of an agency that has been joined as a party, that
the minor is eligible for those services.”).

127. See La. Child. Code Ann. art. 779(C) (2004) (“In any case in which the family has been adjudicated

to be in need of services, the court may order any public institution or agency and its representatives to . . .
[p]rovide any services specified in its order as necessary to improve the family relationships or reunite
the family in the best interests of the child . . . .”).

128. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Justice, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2477, 2479

(2000) (“This promotion of juvenile court as a diversion from criminal justice is distinct from more
ambitious programs of ‘child saving’ intervention because avoiding harm can be achieved even if no
effective crime prevention treatments are available.”).

129. See Charles Lindner, Probation Intake: Gatekeeper to the Family Court, 72 Fed. Probation 48 (2008),

available at http://www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/June_2008/13_probation_intake.html [hereinafter
Lindner, Probation Intake]. Judge Julien W. Mack stated that:
It is the last thing to do with the wayward child to bring him into any court. The wise
probation officer will save him from the court . . . . Of course in the end some will have
to be brought into court. That court is successful in its work that has the least number
of cases.

Id. at 49 (internal citation omitted). Judge W. Waalkes wrote that:

Intake is a permissive tool of potentially great value to the juvenile court. It is unique
because it permits the court to screen its own cases . . . . It can cull out cases which
should not be dignified with further court process. It can save the court from subsequent
time consuming procedures to dismiss a case . . . . It provides machinery for referral of
cases to other agencies when appropriate and beneficial to the child.

Id. (internal citation omitted).
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investigate complaints. Second, upon investigating, intake officers are charged with
a duty to use discretion in weighing whether to recommend that a formal petition be
filed, that the case be diverted to another agency, or that the case be dismissed.
Federal special education policy should meld with these requirements to make special
education considerations centrally important at the intake and referral stages of the
juvenile court process.
		

1. Investigative Requirements

Probation officers in most jurisdictions are charged with a statutory duty to
investigate status offense referrals. The investigative duty is articulated differently
throughout jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions require that a probation officer conduct
a “preliminary inquiry.”130 Other jurisdictions impose a legal obligation on the intake
officer to “examine complaints,”131 “[i]nvestigate all cases referred,”132 and “[r]eceive
and examine written complaints.”133
Some jurisdictions are very specific about the required extent of an intake officer’s
investigation. Florida, for example, requires that youth be “screened” for “[t]he
presence of medical, psychiatric, psychological, substance abuse, educational, or
vocational problems, or other conditions that may have caused the child to come to
the attention of law enforcement or the department” and for “whether the child
poses a danger to himself or herself or others in the community.”134 Some jurisdictions,
however, are not specific about the investigative requirements for intake officers.135
Experience strongly suggests that probation officers are not fully, or even seriously,
investigating status offense referrals from schools to determine whether school
officials have failed to provide appropriate special education services.136 Similarly,
probation officers rarely, if ever, contemplate the applicability and potentially salutary
effects of appropriate special education services for a child with disabilities who is the
subject of a status offense referral for ungovernability vis-à-vis the child’s parents.
Most probation officers are not even aware of the vast services that are potentially
available to children with special education needs.
Whether school administrators are attempting an “end run” of their special
education responsibilities and whether the child facing charges has an undiagnosed
education-related disability should be considered at the “investigative and referral
130. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 39E (2008); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62C.100(1)(b) (2007); Utah R. Jud.

Admin. 7-301 (2006).

131. Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-24.2(2) (2008).
132. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-237(A) (2008).
133. Ala. Code § 12-15-118(1) (2005).
134. Fla. Stat. § 985.145(1)(c)(2) (West 2006).
135. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-24.2 (specifying no specific investigatory requirements).
136. For example, as one scholar has noted, “[i]ntake dispositions are often determined by the previous

offense.” Lindner, Probation Intake, supra note 129, at 49.
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levels” of the delinquency process.137 Intake probation officers therefore should be
investigating whether a school is failing, intentionally or not, to meet its obligations
under the IDEA, and whether the juvenile court is the best place for a child referred
for a status offense. Recognizing the responsibility of intake officers to investigate,
Congress required that agencies referring children to the juvenile court should
transmit special education and disciplinary records.138 At the point of intake, state
law—requiring probation officers to screen out inappropriate cases139—meshes with
the congressional mandate that school authorities provide relevant school records to
the court.
If an intake officer fails to investigate properly and fails to recognize the
significance of special education violations by school personnel, the attorney can
provide school records and explain to the intake officer—and subsequently, if
necessary, to the prosecutor—that the case is really an unfair attempt by school
officials to transform a failure to evaluate and to provide special education services
into a dispute in the juvenile court. Moreover, given the explicit congressional
mandate to provide relevant school records, even if not required explicitly by the state
investigative requirements, a sufficient investigation should require that intake
officers investigate school records. In the event that an intake officer does not, an
attorney should file a motion to dismiss the petition based on violations of the
statutory investigative process.
		

2. Failure to Exercise Discretion

Intake probation officers typically are also empowered by statute to examine
complaints to consider whether to commence a proceeding against a child.140 The legal
duty for intake officers to exercise discretion also comes in many forms depending on
the jurisdiction. Intake officers are required to determine the “appropriateness” 141 of
137. Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 724.
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(6)(B) provides: “An agency reporting a crime committed by a child with a disability

shall ensure that copies of the special education and disciplinary records of the child are transmitted for
consideration by the appropriate authorities to whom the agency reports the crime.” Id. The transfer of
records is subject to the protections of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”). See
Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d at 888 (holding that transfer is permitted by FERPA).

139. See generally Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 284 (1984) (describing New York’s intake process).
140. See Model Act, supra note 5, § 6 (withdrawn from recommendation for enactment as obsolete)

(specifying that the “[p]owers of the probation officer” include “mak[ing] investigations, reports, and
recommendations to the juvenile court; receiv[ing] and examin[ing] complaints and charges of
delinquency, unruly conduct or deprivation of a child for the purpose of considering the commencement
of proceedings . . . [and] mak[ing] appropriate referrals to other private or public agencies of the
community if their assistance appears to be needed or desirable . . . .”); D.C. Code § 16-2305 (2009)
(requiring that intake probation officer recommends whether to file petition; notifies complainant of
recommendation not to file, and that complainant may appeal to the prosecutor). Thus, the intake
probation officer can delay, block, or divert a complaint and, essentially, refer the matter to the public
agency—the school system—that sent it to the court.

141. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.145.
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juvenile court actions taken and to make only “appropriate”142 referrals. Implicit in
these requirements is that intake officers, beyond their investigative duties, exercise
judgment based on their investigative findings with respect to a case.
Some jurisdictions are more explicit and specific about what is required of an
intake officer exercising discretion. For example, Pennsylvania requires that intake
officers “should balance the interests of the victim and protection of the community,
imposition of accountability on the juvenile for offenses committed, and the
development of competencies for the juvenile.”143 Nevada requires that intake officers
“determine whether the best interests of the child or of the public” require formal
processing or informal adjustment.144 Accordingly, through investigation and
decision-making requirements, probation officers are required to function as
gatekeepers to the juvenile court, screening out cases that are inappropriate for
juvenile court intervention.
Despite being charged with statutory obligations to investigate and exercise
discretion, intake officers do not exercise, or exercise only in a limited fashion, this
decision-making role.145 Rather than pushing back, probation officers tend to “go
with the f low” of the school-to-prison pipeline.146 Evidence of this increasing
derogation is found in the fact that the number of petitioned status offense cases
increased 29% between 1995 and 2005.147
Congress, recognizing the gatekeeping function of the juvenile court, intended
for the special education needs of a child to be a factor in the decision-making of
juvenile court officials. For this reason, Congress mandated that a child’s educational
records be forwarded to the court. In light of the federal policy to deinstitutionalize
status offenders, to address the needs of students with disabilities in the least
restrictive environment, and to stop school officials from unilaterally excluding
children with disabilities from school, one should conclude that Congress also
intended that a child’s special education needs would be a significant, and perhaps
determining factor at the intake stage of a status offense matter.
While a court will not assume that intake probation officers and prosecutors will
“rubber stamp” a referral by school authorities, the court can use its supervisory
authority to correct the error if intake probation officers and prosecutors misuse or

142. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-308 (2009); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-24.2.
143. 33 PA.B. 1581 (emphasis added).
144. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62C.100.
145. See, e.g., Lindner, Probation Intake, supra note 129.
146. A nearly identical analysis applies, of course, to prosecutorial decision making. Prosecutors are charged

with determining whether the child’s and the community’s interest weigh in favor of proceeding with a
status offense case. The prosecutor should be acting to ensure the accountability of school administrators
who seek to refer special education students for status offense prosecutions.

147. Puzzanchera & Sickmund, supra note 55, at 72. Status offense petitions formally processed by the

juvenile court also rose from 4.1% to 4.8%. Total petitioned status offense case rate increased 17%
between 1995 and 2005. Id. at 73.
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abuse their discretion.148 As appropriate, based upon the specific facts of a case,
defense attorneys should use special education considerations to convince (1) probation
officers to recommend against petitioning or to divert the child from prosecution; (2)
prosecutors to refuse to charge or to agree to divert; or (3) judges to dismiss or divert
cases at the outset, to refuse to take a plea, to find the child “not guilty” at trial, or to
dismiss at disposition.
An intake probation officer who is fully informed of special education entitlements
should rarely recommend petitioning a status offense case against a child who is
eligible for special education. Nevertheless, the defense attorney must be prepared to
challenge the decision making of, or failure to exercise discretion by, the intake
officer.149 The attorney can file a motion to dismiss the petition based on violations
of the statutory intake process.
E. Substantive Judicial Rulings
		

1. In Need of Rehabilitation

Like probation officers and prosecutors, judges ultimately must determine
whether a child—even if unruly or truant—is “in need of treatment or rehabilitation.”
For example, in the Model Juvenile Court Act, the definition of “unruly child” (like
the definition of “delinquent child”) requires both the deviant conduct and a separate
finding of a “need for treatment and rehabilitation.” 150 The definition is conjunctive,
and the prosecutor must prove both elements.
Representing a child who has access to appropriate and comprehensive services
within the special education system, a defense attorney will be in a strong position to
rebut any presumption that the child is in need of treatment through the juvenile
court. The availability of appropriate services from the special education system,
which are summarized below, signifies that the child is not in need of treatment or
rehabilitation from the juvenile system or through the court’s auspices. In many cases,
if school officials were acting with fidelity in regard to the child’s IDEA rights, the
child would not present as having an unmet need for treatment or rehabilitation. On
this basis, the attorney can move at any point during the proceedings to dismiss the
petition or move at trial for a judgment of acquittal.151
148. See Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 724
149. See generally Joseph B. Tulman, The Role of the Probation Officer in Intake: Stories from Before During and

After the Delinquency Initial Hearing, 3 UDC/DCSL L. Rev. 235, 235–50 (1995) (discussing
responsibilities of an intake officer prior to an initial hearing).

150. Model Act, supra note 5, § 2(4). But cf. In re M.C.F., 293 A.2d 874, 877 (D.C. 1972) (finding rebuttable

presumption that delinquency adjudication establishes need for care and rehabilitation).

151. This is consistent with recent recommendations of the United States General Accounting Office to

Congress regarding how better to reduce state juvenile court costs associated with placing juveniles for
purposes of receiving mental health services, which must be provided in appropriate circumstances by
schools under the IDEA. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice,
supra note 70, at 31 (identifying misunderstanding of school IDEA obligations as one reason why
juvenile courts are burdened with inappropriate and costly cases).
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2. Best Interests of the Child

Beyond substantive requirements to prove the need for rehabilitation, judges, like
probation officers and prosecutors, have inherent authority to consider the best
interests of the child—as well as safety of the community—in handling status offense
cases.152 In some states, a juvenile court judge can grant a motion to dismiss in the
interest of justice and in the best interest of the child, assuming that the judge finds
that the dismissal does not jeopardize the safety of the community.153 A judge who is
aware of the special education needs of a child and who is aware of the extensive
services available for that child should find that the best interests of the child are
served by the special education system rather than the juvenile court.
Services available through special education law are extensive, while the services
available through the juvenile court are limited. Attorneys with knowledge of the
services available under the IDEA can argue that a status offender is not in need of
rehabilitation from the juvenile court because appropriate rehabilitative services are
available within the community, or that the best interests of the child are better
served through the special education system. What follows is an extensive summary
of the services available under the IDEA.
IV.	Services through the IDEA in Contrast with Services through the
Juvenile Court

The range of mandatory, when appropriate, services available through the special
education system is greater and superior to the range of interventions currently
available through the juvenile court. In the special education system, services are
specialized, regularly evaluated, collaborative, preventative, and cost efficient.
Moreover, responsibility for improvement is not placed solely on the shoulders of
children; rather, responsibility is distributed between those giving and those receiving
the services. Juvenile court intervention should be sought only when needed to
effectively implement the services available under the IDEA.
152. Essentially, judges are required “to provide a simple judicial procedure . . . in which the parties are

assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced . . . .”
Model Act, supra note 5, § 1(4). Other legal rights include special education rights, and the simplest
and fairest process often would be to eschew status offense proceedings and to ensure that the child is
receiving appropriate services through the school system and other public agencies in order to succeed at
school and at home.

153. See, e.g., In re Robert T. Doe, 753 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2002) (relying upon juvenile court’s

inherent authority to dismiss status offense matter in the interest of justice); Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 725
(recognizing, in dictum, that trial court could have dismissed the petition in the best interest of the child
but holding that trial court ruled on legal grounds instead). This inherent authority is also articulated in
the purpose clauses of many state juvenile court acts. See, e.g., La. Child. Code Ann. art. 801 (2004)
(“The purpose of this Title is to accord due process to each child who is accused of having committed a
delinquent act and . . . to insure that he shall receive, preferably in his own home, the care, guidance, and
control that will be conducive to his welfare and the best interests of the state . . . .”); Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 119, § 53 (2008) (“Sections fifty-two to sixty-three, inclusive, shall be liberally construed so that the
care, custody and discipline of the children brought before the court shall approximate as nearly as possible
that which they should receive from their parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, not
as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and guidance.”).
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A. Individualized Education Programs

An IEP is a written blueprint of the specialized instruction and other services—
e.g., related services, transition services, assistive technology, program
modifications—that are appropriate for a particular special education student.154 The
IEP must present the child’s current academic levels and functional performance,
include annual goals, and specify how the child’s progress toward the goals will be
measured.155 An IEP team consists of the child’s parents, the child’s regular education
teacher and special education teacher, a school district representative, a person
qualified to interpret evaluation results, other individuals with knowledge of special
education or the child whom the parents or school system representatives invite, and,
whenever appropriate, the child.156 The IEP team must review and revise the IEP at
least annually.157 Notably, the law specifically charges the IEP team with considering
services to address a child’s disruptive behavior: “The IEP Team shall . . .[,] in the
case of a child whose behavior impedes the child’s learning or that of others, consider
the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to
address that behavior . . . .”158 The IEP team must also consider strengths of the
child, evaluations of the child, concerns of the parents, and, of course, “the academic,
developmental, and functional needs of the child.”159
B. Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports

Congress found that, based upon almost three decades of research and experience,
the effectiveness of education for children with disabilities improves with the
provision of whole-school approaches, including positive behavioral interventions
and supports.160 The IEP Team can order a functional behavioral assessment, leading
to the design and implementation of a behavioral intervention plan.161
C. Related Services

A related service is “transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services as [are] required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from

154. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d).
155. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i).
156. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
157. Id. § 1414(d)(4); see also id. § 1414(d)(2)(A) (requiring that an IEP be in place at the start of the school

year).

158. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i).
159. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(i)–(iv).
160. See id. § 1400(c)(5)(F).
161. See id. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)(i) (IEP Team shall consider positive behavioral

interventions and supports); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(ii) (functional behavioral assessment and
behavioral intervention services for child removed to interim alternative educational setting).
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special education,”162 and includes, in essence, anything that supports the student’s
ability to learn and to benefit from education. The federal regulations specifically
identify, among other things, speech-language pathology163 and audiology services,164
and physical165 and occupational therapy.166 Of particular relevance for children
facing status offenses and for their families are the following related services:
• R
 ecreation—assessing leisure function; providing therapeutic
recreation services; providing recreation both in schools and
arranging recreation through community agencies; and educating
the child regarding appropriate leisure activity;167

• C
 ounseling Services—providing services from “qualified social
workers, psychologists, guidance counselors, or other qualified
personnel . . . ;”168
• P
 arent Counseling and Training—helping parents to understand
their child’s special needs, informing parents about child
development, and assisting parents to acquire skills necessary to
support implementation of the IEP;169
• P
 sychological Services—evaluating the child, planning and
managing a program of psychological counseling for the child
and the parents, and helping to develop positive behavioral
intervention strategies;170 and
• S
 ocial Work Services in Schools—studying the child’s social or
developmental history; conducting group and individual
counseling with the child and family; addressing, along with the
parents and others, all aspects of the child’s life that affect
performance in school; engaging school and community resources
to enhance the child’s ability to benefit from the educational
162. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.34 (specifying further “related services”). The requirement to

provide related services includes medical services by a licensed physician only for purposes of diagnosis
or evaluation. See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891–92 (1984) (holding that
catheterization is not covered because it is not diagnostic or evaluative). Moreover, the statute excludes
from coverage “a medical device that is surgically implanted . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(B).

163. 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(c)(15).
164. Id. § 300.34(c)(1).
165. Id. § 300.34(c)(9).
166. Id. § 300.34(c)(6).
167. Id. § 300.34(c)(11).
168. Id. § 300.34(c)(2).
169. Id. § 300.34(c)(8).
170. Id. § 300.34(c)(10).
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program; and helping to develop positive behavioral intervention
strategies.171

Under special education law, any of these services that are appropriate for a particular
child with a disability must be provided, at no charge to the parent, by or through
the public school system.172
D. Transition Services

For students turning sixteen years old and older, the IEP team must consider and
include transition services in the IEP.173 Special education law requires school
personnel to prepare students with disabilities for success after completing high
school,174 and, by definition, “transition services” must be:
[A] coordinated set of activities . . . within a results-oriented process . . .
focused on improving the academic and functional achievement . . . to
facilitate the child’s movement from school to post school activities, including
postsecondary education, vocational education, integrated employment
(including supported employment), continuing and adult education, adult
services, independent living, or community participation . . . .175

Further, transition services must be individualized according to the child’s needs and
in consideration of “the child’s strengths, preferences, and interests . . . .”176 School
personnel must facilitate the development of work and other post-school objectives,
and must provide specialized instruction, related services, and community experiences
that facilitate the transition objectives.177 Accordingly, although school personnel can
engage other agencies to provide transition services, the school personnel must
reconvene the IEP team to develop alternative strategies if other agencies fail to
provide transition services.178

171. Id. § 300.34(c)(14).
172. The IDEA also requires the provision of assistive technology devices and services when appropriate to

increase, maintain, or improve the child’s functional capabilities. Id. at § 300.324(a)(2)(v); see also 20
U.S.C. § 1401(1)–(2).

173. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII) (requiring a plan for transition services, including annual

updates); 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(b) (mandating IEP team to include transition services for children
younger than sixteen, if appropriate).

174. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (characterizing the purposes of IDEA to include preparing children with

disabilities “for further education, employment, and independent living”).

175. 34 C.F.R. § 300.43(a)(1).
176. Id. § 300.43(a)(2).
177. Id. § 300.43(a)(1)–(2). Transition services also include, in appropriate circumstances (e.g., students with

cognitive impairments), training in daily living skills and providing a functional vocational evaluation.
Id. § 300.43(a)(2)(v).

178. Id. § 300.324(c)(1).
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E. Limited Services are Available through the Juvenile Court

The juvenile justice system has limited and typically ineffective services to address
the behavior and needs of status offenders. In most adjudicated status offense cases,
the court orders probation; residential placement is the second most frequent
dispositional outcome.179 Of all status offenders, those adjudicated ungovernable are
the most likely to be placed in a residential facility, while truants are the most likely
of status offenders to be placed on probation.180 An honest appraisal of probation,
however, is that it generally provides minimal services to youth and is a mechanism
by which status offenders can be set up to commit a technical violation. The primary
intervention available through the juvenile court seems to be the threat of incarceration
and incarceration itself.
Admittedly, nothing in the IDEA excludes from coverage, or diminishes the
rights of, children with education-related disabilities who are detained or incarcerated
in delinquency facilities. However, using incarceration to provide status offenders
with IDEA services offends federal policy of deinstitutionalizing status offenders,
mainstreaming students with disabilities in the least-restrictive environment, and
limiting the authority of school officials to unilaterally exclude students with
disabilities.
A defense attorney with knowledge of the range of available services available
through the IDEA can bring this information to the attention of the juvenile court
judge and ask for a continuance to help the parent use special education processes to
line up appropriate services for the child and for the family that will supersede the
perceived need for the status offense proceeding. The defense attorney can later
present the services provided for in the IEP as superior to any intervention that the
juvenile court could provide. In this way, the attorney should be able to rebut the
presumption that the child’s rehabilitation is contingent upon the intervention of the
juvenile court. The juvenile court, however, should appropriately intervene where
intervention can help school officials and parents achieve the goals of an IEP.
Based upon success in the special education due process hearing, including
arranging an appropriate placement and any of the above services, one can anticipate
that the prosecutor or judge will agree to dismiss the status offense matter. If not, the
defense attorney can introduce into the status offense proceeding the findings of fact
and conclusions of law by the special education hearing officer, which may
demonstrate that school personnel have violated the IDEA, that the child’s behavior
underlying the status offense charge is a manifestation of the child’s disability, and
that the hearing officer has ordered appropriate school-based services for the child. If
the juvenile court judge maintains, in the face of the special education findings, that
the child is “guilty” of the status offense charges and is in need of treatment and
rehabilitation from the juvenile system or that a disposition is in the best interests of
a child, the defense attorney—having introduced the special education findings and
order—will be in a strong position to appeal.
179. See OJJDP, National Report, supra note 1, at 192.
180. See id.
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V. Conclusion

A status offense charge suggests that the child is in a crisis situation at school, at
home, or both. For children with disabilities that affect education, the IDEA services
should be sufficient to address the conditions that lead to a status offense referral for
truancy or disruptiveness at school. Further, with regard to a child whose educationrelated disabilities also affect relationships at home, special education services should
be in place to ameliorate the behaviors underlying a status offense referral for
ungovernability. A juvenile defense attorney who provides special education
representation can obtain appropriate services for clients and often extricate those
clients from juvenile court. Problems that developed over a period of years will not
recede and dissipate immediately. The attorney should maintain the special education
representation until the child is making satisfactory progress academically and
emotionally. To be sure, the attorney also has to be keen to the possibility of schools
merely paying lip service to their special education responsibilities and continuing to
provide ineffective services. Through effective special education advocacy, attorneys
can help prevent students with education-related disabilities from being f lushed
down the school-to-prison pipeline.
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